Parashat Mishpatim.

Now these are the judgments. Wherever אלה, “these are”, is used it cuts off (פוסל) the preceding section from that which it introduces; where, however, ואלה “and these” is used it adds something to the former subject (i. e. forms a continuation of it). So also here: “And these are the judgments (i. e. these, also)”: What is the case with the former commandments (the עשרת הדברות)? They were given at Sinai! So these, too, were given at Sinai! (Mekhilta; Shemot Rabbah 30:3; cf. also Midrash Tanchuma, Mishpatim 3) If this be so, why is this section dealing with the “civil laws” placed immediately after that commanding the making of the altar? To tell you that you should seat (i. e. provide quarters for) the Sanhedrin in the vicinity of the Temple.

Which thou shalt put before them. G-d said to Moses: It should not enter your mind to say, “I shall teach them a section of the Torah or a single Halacha twice or three times until it will become current in their mouths exactly according to its wording (i. e. until they know the text verbatim), but I shall not take the trouble to make them understand the reason of each thing and its significance”; therefore Scripture says, אשר תשים לפניהם, “which thou shalt set before them” (cf. Genesis 34:23), like a table fully laid before a person with everything ready for eating (Mekhilta).

Before them. but not before the heathens. Even if you know that in the case of a particular matter of law they will decide it in the same way as Jewish law would, do not bring it before their courts; for he who brings Israel’s law-cases before the heathens defames the Name of the Lord and pays honour to the name of the idol (in the name of which the heathen court administers justice), thereby giving it undue importance, as it is said, (Deuteronomy 32:31) “For their rock is not as our Rock that our enemies should be judges over us”, which implies: when our enemies are judges over us (i. e. if we make them judges over us) it is a testimony to the superiority of that which they reverence (their idol) (Midrash Tanchuma, Mishpatim 3).

If thou buyest an עבד עברי. This means a servant who is a Hebrew. Or perhaps this is not so, but it means a servant of a Hebrew (one who had been the servant of a Hebrew), i. e. a Canaanitish servant whom thou hast bought from an Israelite, and it is with regard to him that Scripture states “six years he shall serve”!, And if you ask, how I will then explain the commandment, (Leviticus 25:46) “and you shall leave them (the Canaanitish servants) as an inheritance for your children [and they shall serve you forever]”? then I reply, that this refers to the case of a Canaanitish servant who has been bought from a heathen; but if such a servant has been bought from an Israelite he shall go free at the end of six years!, This explanation that our text refers to a Canaanite servant will not hold, for Scripture states, (Deuteronomy 15:12) “and if thy brother an Hebrew man be sold unto thee [and serve thee six years, then in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free from thee]”, the Torah says, as it were, by using the two terms העברי and אחיך: I tell you this (that the servant shall go free in the seventh year) only with regard to thy brother! Consequently Leviticus 25:46 has to be applied to any Canaanite servant, whether bought from a Hebrew or from a heathen and עבד עברי in our text can only denote עבד שהוא עברי. (Mekhilta)

‎כי תקנה if thou buyest [an hebrew servant]. This means an Hebrew servant whom thou hast bought from the hand of the court which sold him for a theft which he had committed, as it is said, (Exodus 22:2) “if he (the thief) have nothing, then shall he be sold for his theft”. Or perhaps this is not so, but Scripture is referring to the case of one who sells himself as a servant on account of his destitution, whilst he who has been sold by the court for his theft shall not go free at the end of six years! This assumption it erroneous, for when Scripture states, (Leviticus 25:39, 40) “and if thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and he sells himself unto thee … [he shall serve thee unto the year of jubilee]”, it is plain that in this passage there is mentioned the case of one who sells himself on account of his destitution. How then must I explain כי תקנה in this verse? Obviously as referring to him who was sold by the court (Mekhilta).

. means INTO FREEDOM (i. e. חפשי is a noun like חֹפֶשׁ but having a redundant י at the end).

If he came in by himself. This means that he was unmarried, as the Targum renders it אם בלחודוהי, if he came in “alone”. The term בגפו is the same as גף) בכנפו being synonymous with כנף wing, skirt) i. e. he came in only just as he was, alone, merely wrapped in his garment: so that בגפו, “in his skirt”, means “in the skirt of his garment”.

He shall go out by himself. This intimates that if he was unmarried originally (when he came in), his master is not allowed to give him against his will a Canaanitish handmaid with the object of raising slaves (Kiddushin 20a).

If he be married. to an Israelite woman (Mekhilta)

. then HIS WIFE SHALL GO OUT WITH HIM, But who brought her in (into the state of service) that the text has to state she shall go out? But by saying this Scripture intimates that he who acquires a Hebrew servant is bound to provide his wife and children also with food (Mekhilta; Kiddushin 22a).

If his Lord has given him a wife. From this we learn that if he has already an Israelite wife the master has the right to give him a Canaanitish handmaid with the object of raising slaves. Or perhaps this is not so, but Scripture by אשה is speaking about an Israelite woman?! Scripture, however, states: “the wife and her children shall be the master’s”, consequently the text can only be speaking of a Canaanitish woman, for a Hebrew maidservant goes free at the end of six years just as a Hebrew man-servant does, yea, even before the termination of six years she goes free if she shows symptoms of incipient puberty (cf. Rashi v. 7), for it is said, (Deuteronomy 15:12) “[and if] thy brother, an Hebrew man, or an Hebrew woman, [be sold unto thee, and serve thee six years, then in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free from thee]”, which statement teaches you that a Hebrew woman also goes free after six years’ service (Mekhilta; Kiddushin 14b).

My wife. the Canaanitish handmaid mentioned above.

. means to the court. He (the slave) should take counsel with his vendors (the court) because it was they who sold him to him (the master) (Mekhilta).

To the door or to the doorpost. From this statement you might think that the doorpost is also a proper thing upon which the servant’s ear may be pierced! Scripture, however, states, (Deuteronomy 15:17) “[Then thou shalt take an awl], and thrust it through his ear and into the door”, into the door but not into the doorpost. If this be so, what is the purpose of Scripture stating here “[to the door] or to the doorpost”? By this juxtaposition it only compares the door with the doorpost. What is the characteristic of the doorpost? It is something perpendicular! So, too, the door must during the act of performation be in a perpendicular position (on its hinges), not detached as, for instance, lying on the ground (Mekhilta; Kiddushin 22b).

And his Lord shall bore his ear through with the awl. “His ear” means his right ear. Or perhaps this is not so, but Scripture means his left ear? Scripture however uses the term אזן here and it uses אזן in another passage, thereby suggesting an analogy based upon verbal similarity; viz., here it is said “and his lord shall bore his ear (אזנו) through”, and of the leper it is said, (Leviticus 14:25) “and the priest shall put it upon the tip of the right ear (אזנו הימית) of him that is to be cleansed”., How is it in that latter passage? It is the right ear! So here, too, it is the right ear., What is the reason that the ear had to be pierced rather than any other limb of the servant’s body? Rabban Jochanan ben Zaccai said: That ear which heard on Mount Sinai, (Exodus 20:13) “Thou shalt not steal” and yet its owner went and stole and was therefore sold as a slave, let it be pierced! Or, in the case of him who sold himself from destitution, having committed no theft, the reason is: That ear which heard on Mount Sinai what I said, (Leviticus 25:55) “For unto Me the children Israel are servants” and yet its owner went and procured for himself another master, let it be pierced! (Mekhilta; Kiddushin 22b). Rabbi Simeon interpreted this verse like a jewel (i. e. giving it an ethical signification): In what respect are door and doorpost different from all other objects in the house that they should be singled out for this purpose? G-d, in effect, said: door and doorpost that were eye-witnesses in Egypt when I passed over the lintel and the two doorposts, freeing Israel from slavery, and when I said, (Leviticus 25:55) “For unto Me the children of Israel are servants”, servants to Me but not servants of servants (of human beings), and yet this man went and procured another master for himself, let him be pieced in their presence (i. e. let them be eye-witnesses now when this man voluntarily prolongs his state of slavery)! (Kiddushin 22b.)

And he shall serve him for ever. This means until the Jubilee. Or, perhaps this is not so, but לעולם means for ever as is its usual meaning? Scripture however, states, (Leviticus 25:10) “[And ye shall sanctify the fiftieth year and proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof] and ye shall return every man unto his family”. A comparison of these two passages tells us that a period of fifty years is termed עולם. This does not, however, imply that he has to serve him a whole period of fifty years, but that he has to serve him until the year of the Jubilee (the fiftieth year) whether this be close at hand or far ahead (Kiddushin 15a; Mekhilta).

And if a man sell his daughter to be a maidservant. The text speaks of a minor daughter (under 12 years of age). You might think that he may sell her also although she may have shown signs of incipient puberty and is no longer a minor! You must admit, however, that the à fortiori argument applies: How is it in the case of a woman who was sold at an earlier age (as a minor)? She goes free on showing signs of incipient puberty, as it is said, (v. 11) “then shall she go out free without money”, which law we explain to refer to a woman who has showed such signs during the period of slavery! Is it not the conclusion that she who is of such an age and has not yet been sold shall not be sold at all?! (Arakhin 29b, cf. Mekhilta).

She shall not go out as the menservants do. i. e. not under the circumstances that the Canaanitish menservants’ departure takes place, for these go free in consequence of the loss of their tooth or eye inflicted by their master; this woman, however, shall not go free because of such loss of her tooth or eye, but shall serve either six years or until the Jubilee, or until she shows signs of incipient puberty. Whichsoever of these periods comes first brings her freedom first., He (the master), however, has to pay her the value of her eye or the value of her tooth., Or perhaps this is not so, but, “she shall not go out as the men-servants do,” means she shall not go free as the Hebrew menservants do, viz., at the end of six years or at the Jubilee? Scripture, however, states, (Deuteronomy 15:12) And if thy brother, an Hebrew man or an Hebrew woman be sold unto thee”, comparing the Hebrew woman with the Hebrew man in regard to all reasons for departure (i. e. also with regard to her going free in the Jubilee, for that she goes free in the seventh year is stated in the text just quoted). How is it in the case of a Hebrew man? He goes free at the end of six years and at the Jubilee! So, too, does the Hebrew woman go free at the end of six years and at the Jubilee. What then do these words mean: “she shall not go out as the menservants do”? They mean: she shall not go free in consequence of the loss of one of “the tips of her limbs” (i. e. the ends of limbs that project from the body) (cf. Mishnah Negaim 6:7) inflicted by the master, as the Canaanitish servants do when they that lose “the tips of their limbs” (Mekhilta; Kiddushin 20a). Incidentally I may add that you might think that the Hebrew manservant shall go free in consequence of loss of one of the tips of his limbs and that only the Hebrew maidservant differs in this respect from the Canaanitish servant, since Scripture expressly specified her in the words: she shall not go out free etc. Scripture, however, states “an Hebrew man or an Hebrew woman” thereby comparing the Hebrew man with the Hebrew woman. What is the case with the Hebrew woman? She does not go free in consequence of loss of one of “the tips of her limbs”! So, too, the Hebrew man does not go free as compensation for the injury inflicted on one of “the tips of his limbs” (cf. Mekhilta).

If she be evil in the eyes of her Lord. i. e. that she did not find favour in his eyes so that he might be induced to marry her (cf. Mekhilta).

. means: [IF SHE BE EVIL IN THE EYES OF HER LORD] WHO OUGHT TO HAVE DESIGNATED HER to be his wife and ought to have married her, her purchase-money serving as the money necessary to contract a marriage (כסף קידושין). Scripture hereby implicitly tells you that it is his duty to designate her for himself, and since it makes no mention of the manner in which the marriage is to be contracted it implicitly tells you at the same time that she requires no other rite of marriage than the passing of the purchase-money from the master to her father (cf. Kiddushin 19a, Bekhorot 13a).

. means he shall afford her the opportunity to obtain her release from service, that he himself must cooperate in respect to the amount of her ransom. And what is this opportunity he has to give her? That he allows her a deduction from her ransom corresponding to the number of years she has served in his house, as though she were only hired by him. How can this be done? Supposing he had bought her for a maneh (one hundred shekels) and she had served him two years. We say to him: “You knew that she was to go free at the end of six years; it follows then that you bought the labour of each year for one sixth of a maneh. Now she has served you two years, that is the equivalent of one-third of the maneh: accept therefore two-thirds of a maneh as a ransom and let her go free out of your house (Kiddushin 14b).

. means that neither the master nor the father has a right to sell her to another Jewish man (Kiddushin 18a)

Seeing that he hath dealt deceitfully with her. If “he” means the master then these words signify: if he intends to deal faithlessly with her, i. e. if he does not intend to fulfil the commandment of “Jiud” (of designating her to himself). So also the father, he has no right to sell her to another man since he has dealt faithlessly with her as a father having sold her to this man (Mekhilta; Kiddushin 18b).

And if he hath betrothed her to his son. “He” means the master (not like “he” in the previous verse where it refers both to the master and to the father). The verse teaches you that the son also may succeed to his father’s rights to betroth her to himself, if his father consents to it. Then it is not necessary for him either (just as is not obligatory for his father; cf. v. 8) to perform another act of betrothal, but he merely says to her: “You are designated for me as my wife by means of the money which your father has received from my father as your price” (Kiddushin 19a).

[he shall do unto her] after the manner of daughters. who may claim food, clothing and marital duty (Mekhilta).

If he take him another wife. besides her

Her food, her raiment and the marital duty shall he not withhold. from the maidservant whom he has already designated as his wife.

. means FOOD;

. means what the literal sense of the word is:RAIMENT;

. means THE MARITAL DUTY (Ketuvot 47b).

. means IF HE DO NOT one of THESE THREE UNTO HER. What are these three? He should designate her to himself as his wife, or to his son, or allow her a deduction from the ransom so that she may go free (Mekhilta). This man, however, has neither betrothed her to himself, nor to his son, and she herself does not possess the entire sum paid for her originally that she might buy herself out, therefore shall she go out free without money.

Then shall she go out for nothing. (i. e. without making any payment), Scripture adds in her case one more way of acquiring freedom than it provides for menservants. What is this additional way of acquiring freedom? This verse teaches you that she goes free also on account of having shown signs of incipient puberty: but she must stay with him until she reaches this stage of incipient puberty. For that she goes free if the termination of the six years happened to come before the signs of incipient puberty we have already learned, since it is said, (Deuteronomy 15:12) ,‘[and if thy brother], an Hebrew man, or an Hebrew woman [be sold unto thee], and serve thee six years [then in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free from thee]” (cf. Rashi v. 7). What then must be the meaning of what is stated here, “she shall go out for nothing”? That when the signs of incipient puberty appear before the six years are at end she shall go out on account of them. Or perhaps Scripture states here that she shall go free only when she has reached the intermediate stage of womenhood (בגרות, fuller development after twelve years and a half), if this stage happened to be reached before the termination of the six years! To teach this Scripture states “without money”, which would be superfluous since it has already said “she shall go out חנם”, in order to add as another date of her acquiring freedom the time of her reaching this stage of womanhood. And though it necessarily follows that she goes free an reaching the state of בגרות since her freedom is brought about even by the earlier stage of נערות yet if Scripture had not used both terms (both חנם and אין כסף), I might have said that ויצאה חנם refers to the stage of womanhood; therefore both expressions are used in order to give a disputant no opportunity to offer a different explanation (i. e. Scripture wishes to be quite clear on the point in order to preclude all possibility of misunderstanding) (Mekhilta; Kiddushin 4a).

Whosoever smiteth a man so that he die [shall surely be put to death]. Many apparently redundant verses have been written in various sections of the Torah dealing with murderers and I shall explain to the best of my ability why all these statements have been made.

Whosoever smiteth a man so that he die. Why is this said (how does the particular form of words used here tell us some point of law which is not contained in another text bearing upon the same subject)? Since it is said, (Leviticus 24:17) “And the man that smiteth (יכה) any person (more lit., the soul of any human being) [shall surely be put to death]”, I might have inferred that mere smiting without resultant death is subject to the death penalty. Scripture therefore states here, “Whosoever smiteth a man so that he die [shall surely be put to death]”, thus telling you that he is not punishable with death unless the stroke proves fatal. On the other hand if it had stated here, “Whosoever smiteth a man…” and it had not said there “If a man smiteth [any person]”, I might have inferred that the murderer is not guilty except if he killed “a man”; whence, however, could I know that he is subject to the death penalty if he killed a woman or a minor? Therefore Scripture states “And if [a man] smiteth any person”, thus including even a minor and a woman. Then again: if it had stated only, “Whosoever smiteth a man” I might have inferred that even a minor who smote and killed a person is punishable with death. Scripture therefore states “and if a man smiteth”, a man but not a minor. Then on the other hand, so far as concerns the statement “And if [a man] smiteth the soul of any man” it might be held that even premature births at a term of eight months are included in the term כל נפש אדם “soul of any man”, Scripture therefore states “Whosoever smiteth a man” to intimate that one is not subject to the death penalty unless he kills a viable child, one which is fitted to become a man (Mekhilta).

And if a man lie not in wait. i. e. if he did not lie in ambush for him (the person whom he killed), nor did he premeditate the blow (Makkot 7b).

. is a term denoting “lying in wait”; similarly it says, (I Samuel 24:12) “yet thou liest in wait (צדה) for my soul to take it”. It is, however, not correct to say that צדה is of the same derivation as, (Genesis 27:34) הצד ציד “he that hath hunted (הצד) venison”, for a ה has no place in the verbal forms of the term denoting “hunting beasts”. Then again, the noun form of the latter is צַיִד and that of the former צְדִיָה, whilst the participle of the verb “lying in wait” is צוֹדֶה and that of the other is צָד. I therefore say that its meaning is as the Targum gives it: “and if he did not lie in ambush for him”. Menachem ben Seruk placed it in the same section as הצד ציד (i. e. he held that the root is צד and that it has the meaning of “hunting”), but I do not agree with him. If it is to be placed in one of the sections of צד we had better place it in the same section as, (Isaiah 66:12) על צד תנשאו “ye shall be borne upon her side (צד)” and (I Samuel 20:20) “and I will shoot [three arrows] on the side thereof (צדה)”, and (Daniel 7:25) “and he shall speak towards the side of (against) the Most High”. Thus, here, the words אשד לא צדה could be taken to mean, “he did not turn aside (צִדֵּד)” to seek some side (occasion) for killing him. But there are objections even to this explanation. At any rate, even if it be connected with צד in this sense, it would still have the meaning “lying in wait”.

. means, BUT G-D GOT IT READY FOR HIS HAND. It has the same meaning as this root has in, (Psalms 91:10) “No evil shall be got ready (תאנה) for thee”; (Proverbs 12:21) “There shall no evil be got ready (תאנה) for the just”; (2 Kings 5:7) “he gets himself ready (מתאנה) for me”, i. e. he gets himself ready to discover some occasion against me.

But G-d got it ready for his hand. But why should this go forth from Him (be brought about by G-d)? This is just what David tells us: (I Samuel 24:13) “As says the proverb of the ancient (הקדמני) “Wickedness proceededeth from the wicked”., “The proverb of the קדמני” is the Torah, the maxim of G-d, Who it the “Ancient” (Whose existence preceded that) of the world. But where indeed does the Torah say, “Wickedness proceedeth from the wicked”? It says it implicitly in the verse: “But G-d got it ready for his hand”. For what is Scripture here speaking about? About two men, one of whom killed a person with premeditation and the other killed inadvertently, and in neither case were there witnesses to the deed who could testify about it. Consequently, the former was not put to death and the latter was not forced into banishment to a city of refuge (cf. Numbers 35:11). Now G-d brings them together at the same inn. He who killed with premeditation happens to sit beneath a ladder, and the other who killed inadvertently ascends the ladder and falls, when descending it, upon the man who killed with premeditation and kills him. Witnesses now being present they testify against him, so compelling him to be banished to one of the cities of refuge. The result is that he who killed inadvertently is actually banished and he who killed with premeditation actually suffers death (cf. Mekhilta and Makkot 10b).

And i will appoint thee a place. in the wilderness also, WHITHER HE SHALL FLEE, Which was the place that offered him an asylum? The camp of the Levites (Mekhilta; Makkot 12b).

And if a man act intentionally. Why is this stated at all (since v. 13 expressly provides a place for the murderer only if he does not lie in wait)? Since it is said, (v. 12) “Whosoever smiteth a man [so that he die shall be put to death]”, I might infer that this is so even if the victim is a heathen, and that there it included even a physician who kills a person as a result of his treatment, and a court-officer who kills a man when inflicting on him the forty lashes, and a father who beats and thereby kills his son, and a teacher who chastises his pupil and thereby kills him, and one who kills in error (שוגג, i. e. one who intended to kill a certain person but missed the mark and killed another instead, נתכוין להרוג את זה והרג את זה)! Scripture therefore states here: “if a man acts intentionally (יזיד)”, but not in error (שוגג); “against his fellowman (רעהו)”, but not against a heathen; “to slay with guile (בערמה)”, thus excluding the court-officer, the physician, and one who chastises his son or his pupil for all these though acting intentionally do not do so with guile (cf. Mekhilta).

Thou shalt take him from my altar, that he may die. even if he is a priest and stands at the altar intending to officiate thou shalt take him away that he die (cf. Mekhilta; Yoma 85a).

And he that smiteth his father or his mother [shall surely be put to death]. Because Scripture has taught us that he who inflicts a wound upon his fellow-man is liable for damages (cf. Rashi on Exodus 21:24) but is not subject to death, it was compelled to state that he who inflicts a wound on his father or his mother is subject to the death penalty (Mekhilta). He is, however, not punishable with death except for a blow which causes a wound (Sanhedrin 85b).

. means either his father or his mother (Mekhilta).

Shall be put to death. by strangulation (Mekhilta).

And he that stealeth a man, and selleth him, [and he be previously found in his hand, he shall surely be put to death]. Why is this statement made (how does the particular form of words used here tell us some point of law which is not contained in another text bearing upon the same subject)? Since it is said, (Deuteronomy 24:7) “If a man be found stealing any of his brethren … [then that thief shall die]”, I might say that I have here only the law that a man who stole a person is punishable with death. Whence, however, do I know that this is also the case if a woman or a person whose sex is not distinguishable or a hermaphrodite (טומטום ואנדרונינוס) has stolen a person? Scripture therefore states here: “Whosoever stealeth a man and selleth him”., And again, since Scripture states here: “He that stealeth a man [shall be put to death]”, I might say that I have here only the law that if one steals a man he is punishable with death. Whence do I know that this is also the case if he has stolen a woman? Therefore Scripture states, (Deuteronomy 24:7) “[If a man be found] stealing any person [he shall be put to death]”. Consequently both verses are necessary: what the one omits the other tells us (Mekhilta; Sanhedrin 85b).

. implies that witnesses have seen him stealing and also saw him selling the person, and that he has been found in his possession before he had sold him (Mekhilta).

He shall surely be put to death. by strangulation. Wherever the death-penalty is mentioned in Scripture without being precisely defined strangulation is intended (Mekhilta; Sanhedrin 84b). [It should be noted that Scripture interrupted the context by writing “Whosoever stealeth etc.” between the passages, “He that smiteth his father etc.” and “He that curseth his father etc.”, which passages ought on account of their contents to follow one after the other. I think that this gave rise to the difference of opinion found in Sanhedrin 85a where one Rabbi holds that we must put “smiting” on an equality with “cursing”, in spite of the text being interrupted by the verse וגונב, which, however, is placed between them only to teach that in some respects “smiting” and “cursing” have not the same law, that after the death of the parents “cursing” them is punishable whilst “smiting” them is not; whilst another bolds that since the two verses have been disconnected “smiting” can by no means be put on an equality with, and have the same legal consequenses as, “cursing” (cf. Sanhedrin 85b)].

Whosoever curseth his father or his mother [shall surely be put to death]. Why is this stated in this particular form? Since Scripture says, (Leviticus 20:9) “For every man who execrateth his father [or his mother shall surely be put to death]” I might say that I have here only the law that a man who curseth his father or his mother is punishable with death. Whence do I know that this is also the case if a woman curseth her father or her mother? Scripture therefore states here, “Whosoever curseth father or mother”, whosoever generally, intimating that it applies to both man and woman (Mekhilta). But if this be so why is it said, (Leviticus 20:9). “For every man who execrateth etc.”? To exclude a minor.

Shall surely be put to death. by stoning. And the rule is that wherever the term “his blood is upon him “is used in connection with the death penalty, “execution by stoning” is meant. The following in the passage from which this is evident (בנין אב): (Leviticus 20:27) “they shall overwhelm them with stones: their blood is upon them”, and as regards one who curses father or mother (Leviticus 20:9), Scripture indeed uses the words דמיו בו (Mekhilta; Sanhedrin 66a).

And if men quarrel. Why is this (vv. 18, 19) stated in this particular form? Since Scripture states, (v. 24) “Eye for eye”, we learn from this only that compensation for the loss of limbs has to be paid, but we cannot infer from it that indemnity for loss of time (during which the injured has been disabled from work) and cost of medical treatment have also to be paid; consequently this section (vv. 18 and 19) is said (Mekhilta).

But keepeth his bed. The meaning is as the Targum gives it: ויפל לבוטלן “and he falls into inactivity”, i. e. he falls into an illness that prevents him from working.

. (lit., with that on which he relies), i. e. his former healthy state and vigour (Mekhilta; cf. Onkelos).

[when he rises again…] he that smote him shall be freed. But could it enter your mind that this person who has not killed anyone at all should be subject to the death penalty? Why, then, is it necessary to state this? But it is intended to teach you that he is kept in prison until we discover whether the other is completely healed or not, and what the verse implies is this: when this man rises again (אם יקום) and walks in the street in his former vigour, then he who smote him shall be freed from prison, but so long as the other has not risen from the sick-bed etc. the man who smote him is not freed (Ketubot 33b; Sanhedrin 78b).

Only [he shall pay for] the loss of his time. i. e. for the interruption of his labour due to this illness. If, for instance, he cut off his hand or his foot, we regard the interruption of labour caused by this illness as though his occupation were that of a watchman in a cucumber field (which work can be done even by a man lacking a hand or a foot), for even after he has recovered from the illness he will not be able to do work which requires hands or feet, and indeed the value of his hand or his foot that was cut off the other has already paid to him as “damages” (נזק), as it is said, (v. 24) “hand for hand, foot for foot”. (Having compensated him already for loss of capacity as a wage-earner whole in body, it would not be right if this man has again to pay him for loss of time as though he were of full-earning capacity) (Bava Kamma 85b).

. Translate it as the Targum does: he shall pay the physician’s fee.

And if a man smite his servant or his maidservant. Scripture speaks of a Canaanitish servant. Or perhaps this is not so, but it speaks of a Hebrew servant? Scripture however states, (Exodus 21:21) “for he is his money”. How is it in the case of his money? It is something that is his forever (i. e. it is something the possession of which is not limited to a definite time)! So also the servant referred to here is such a one as is his forever (and only a Canaanitish servant serves his master for ever, cf. Leviticus 25:46, whilst the Hebrew servant goes free after six years). But surely he (one that smites his servant) is included in the general statement, (Exodus 21:12) ”Whosoever smiteth a man [so that he die shall surely be put to death]”; why, then, is this case mentioned at all? But Scripture singles it out from the general statement that he (who smiteth his servant etc.) may be subject to the particular regulation of “a day or two” (Exodus 21:21), that if he (the servant) does not die beneath his hand and continue to live twenty-four hours his master should be freed from the death-penalty (Mekhilta).

With a rod. Scripture speaks of a rod that is capable of inflicting death. Or perhaps it speaks even of one that is not capable of inflicting death (but some-how or other the servant died beneath his hand)? Scripture however states, (Numbers 35:17) in reference to an Israellite (cf. Numbers 35:15) “And if he smote him with a stone in the hand, wherewith he may die, [and he die, he is a murderer]”. Now is not the following statement a logical conclusion à fortiori? How is it if one has killed an Israelite whose case is more stringent (inasmuch as the leniency mentioned in v. 21 is not applied to it)? He is not subject to the death penalty unless he smote him with an instrument capable of inflicting death and unless it be a limb through the striking of which by such an instrument he is likely to die! Then in the case of a servant where (as can be seen from v. 21) the conditions are less stringent, does it not follow all the more that he is not subject to the death penalty? (cf. Mekhilta).

He shall surely be avenged. This means execution by the sword. For thus does Scripture state, (Leviticus 26:25) “a sword avenging the vengeance of my covenant” (Mekhilta; Sanhedrin 52b).

Notwithstanding if he continue a day or two, he shall not be avenged. If the master is free of the death penally in case of the servant remaining alive one day, is it not logical that he is free if he lives two days (what need is there for Scripture to add יומים)? But it adds it to show that the term יום is to be defined by יומים, “a day that is like two days”. And what kind of day is thereby meant? A period of twenty-four hours (a day which comprises a part of two separate days) (cf. Mekhilta).

He shall not be avenged: for he is his money. However, any other person who smote him (the servant) is subject to the death penalty although he lived 24 hours before dying.

If men strive. with each other and one intended to strike the other and inadvertently struck the woman (Sanhedrin 79b).

And hurt [a woman with child]. The root נגף always signifies “dashing against” and “striking”. Examples are: (Psalms 91:15) “lest thou dash (תגוף) thy foot against a stone”; (Jeremiah 13:16) “and before your feet dash (יתנגפו)”; (Isaiah 8:14) “but for a stone of dashing (נגף).

And yet there be no mischief. no further mischief with the woman (Sanhedrin 79b).

He shall surely be amerced. to pay the value of the offspring to the husband. We estimate her value according to what she is worth if she were sold as a slave in the market giving her a higher value on account of her being with child (Bava Kamma 49a).

. (lit., he shall surely be punished), It means that they shall exact money from him. ענוש is used here in the same sense as in, (Deuteronomy 22:19) “And they shall amerce (וענשו) him an hundred shekel of silver”.

. means, when the husband will summons him before the Court that they should place upon him a fine for this (cf. Mekhilta)

Then he shall give. i. e. the man that struck the woman shall give the value of the offspring.

According to the decision of the judges. (Mekhilta).

And if there be any further mischief. in the case of the woman

Then thou shalt give soul for soul. Our Rabbis differ as to the explanation of the word נפש the first time it occurs here. There are some who say that it actually signifies “life” (i. e. life for life), others say that it means monetary compensation but not literally life, and they say that this must be so because he who intends to kill a certain person and inadvertently kills another instead, (as is the case here), is exempt from the death penalty, and has only to pay to his heirs his value estimating this as though he were sold as a slave in the market (Sanhedrin 79a).

Eye for eye. If one blinded the eye of his fellow-man he has to pay him the value of his eye, i. e. he pays him how much his value would be diminished if he were to be sold as a slave in the market. In the same way all other cases are to be dealt with, but it does not mean the actual cutting off of the offender’s limb, just as our Rabbis have explained in the chapter beginning with the word החובל (Bava Kamma 84a).

Burning for burning. כויה is a burn produced by fire. Up to here (i .e. v. 24) Scripture has spoken of a bodily injury that is attended by a decrease of the market-value of the person injured; here, however, it speaks of a case in which there is no decrease of value but pain alone: if, for instance, a man burns another on his nails with a hot spit, we estimate how much a person like him (the injured) would be willing to accept for undergoing a pain like this, and such an amount the other has to pay as indemnity (Bava Kamma 84b).

. is an injury which draws blood, the accused having crushed the other’s flesh; navrure in old French In such a case it all depends upon what happens: if any decrease in his market-value is caused the other pays him an indemnity (נזק); if he is confined to his bed, he has to pay for loss of time, for medical treatment, for the shame he feels at being somewhat disfigured and for the pain he has been made to suffer. This passage, (פצע תחת פצע), is apparently redundant, but our Rabbis explained in the chapter beginning with the word החובל (Bava Kamma 85b) that Scripture intends by this statement to make one liable to pay for pain inflicted even in a case when one has already paid damages (נזק) for decrease in one’s value, that although he has paid him the value of his hand, we do not exempt him from paying also for pain inflicted, arguing thus: Since he has, so to say, purchased his hand by paying its value, he was entitled to cut if off by whatever means he pleases; but we say that he ought to have removed it by means of a poisonous drug when he would not have suffered so much pain. He, however, cut if off by means of an iron instrument and caused him great pain; therefore he is bound to pay for pain inflicted also.

. is a wound in which the blood is congealed but does not come out, only that the flesh on that spot becomes red. The word חבורה means tache in old French Similar is, (Jeremiah 13:23) “[Can an Ethiopian change his skin] or the leopard his spots (חברברתיו)”. The Targum renders it (חבורה) by משקופי, an expression denoting “beating”, batture in old French Similarly it translates (Genesis 41:6) שדופות קדים, “blasted with the east”, by שקיפן קדום, “beaten by the east wind”. So, too, the lintel it termed “משקוף” (from the root שקף “to beat upon”), as, e. g., in the expression על המשקוף, because the door beats against it.

[and if a man smite] the eye of his servant. of a Canaanitish servant; but the Hebrew servant does not got free on account of his tooth or his eye having been knocked out by his master, as we have stated in our comment on the passage לא תצא כצאת העבדים (v. 7).

[he shall let him go free] for his eye’s sake. and similarly if he cuts off one of the twenty-four “tips of limbs” viz., the fingers, the toes, the two ears, the nose and the ראש הגויה, the membrum (cf. Mishnah Negaim 6:7). But why, since the precept is not applicable to eye and tooth alone but to twenty-four limbs, are both the eye and the tooth, mentioned? One would have stufficed! Because if only the eye were mentioned and not the tooth also, I might have said: What it the characteristic of the eye? It came into the world together with him! So, too, this law is applicable only to such limbs as came into the world together with him, but not to the tooth, for the tooth did not come into the world together with him. If, on the other hand, only the tooth had been mentioned and not the eye also, I might have said: the law applies even to a case when the master knocked out a child-slave’s tooth which grows again (more lit., which has a substitute) after a time. Therefore the eye is also mentioned to intimate that the law can be applied only when the master knocks out the tooth of his adult slave which, like the eye, does not grow again. (Kiddushin 24b).

And if an ox thrust. This law applies to an ox as well to any other cattle, wild beast or fowl, but Scripture mentions the ox, because it speaks of what usually occurs (Bava Kamma 54b).

And its flesh shall not be eaten. From what is implied in the words “the ox shall surely be stoned” do I not know that it becomes carrion, and carrion of course is prohibited to be eaten? Why then is it stated, “and its flesh shall not be eaten”? It is to intimate that even if he slaughtered the animal according to regulation after sentence of stoning has been pronounced but before it had been carried out it is forbidden to be eaten. Whence may it be proved that under such circumstances it is prohibited to derive any other benefit from it? Scripture therefore states: “and the owner of the ox is נקי”, it is a phrase such as a man uses to his fellow: that man there has gone away “empty” (נקי) of all his property (he has nothing whatever left), and he has not the slightest benefit of it. This is how the Halachic Midrash explains it (Bava Kamma 41a). However, the real sense of ובעל השור נקי, is what it literally means: the owner of the ox shall be guiltless. Because Scripture says with reference to the מועד (an ox which inflicted injury three times in succession, and about which its owner must therefore be regarded as forewarned), (v. 29) “and his owner also shall be put to death”, it was forced to state with regard to the תם (a hitherto innocuous animal, having inflicted an injury for the first time) “the owner of the ox shall be guiltless”.

[but if the ox has been wont to thrust] yesterday and before yesterday. Here you have including the present occasion the three times an ox must gore before it can be declared a מועד (Bava Kamma 23b).‎

And it hath been testified to his owner. הועד (from the root עוד) is an expression for warning through witnesses (Bava Kamma 24a), as in, (Genesis 43:3) “the man hath solemnly forewarned (הָעֵד הַעִד) us”.

But he hath put to death a man [or woman]. Since it states, (v. 28) “If an ox gore (יגח) [a man or a woman, that he die]” I might say that I have only the law dealing with the case that it kills by pushing him with the horn (the root נגח being mainly used of thrusting with the horn, cf. e .g., Deuteronomy 33:17) but whence can the law be derived that it applies also to the case where it kills by biting, thrusting, or kicking? Scripture therefore states “he hath put to death [a man or a woman]” thus intimating that so long as death is caused by the animal it is liable to stoning.

And his owner also shall be put to death. by a visitation of G-d. You might perhaps think he shall be punished by human agency (the judges)! Scripture, however, states, (Numbers 35:21) “he that smote him (a human being) shall surely be put to death; for he is a murderer”, the force of these last words is to intimate that for a murder committed by himself you shall put him to death (i. e. he suffers death by human agency as is the law regarding a murderer), but you shall not put him to death on account of a murder committed by his ox; this must be left to G-d (Sanhedrin 15b; cf. also Mekhilta).

When there be set on him a ransom. This אם is not conditional (i. e. it does not mean “if” the heirs feel inclined to set on him a ransom) but it has the same meaning as in (Exodus 22:24) “When (אם) thou lendest money” where it has the meaning of אשר, “when” (for it is a duty to lend money to the poor and it is not optional). It is the law regarding him that the court should set on him a ransom.

He shall give the ransom of his soul. the value of the injured person; this is the view of R. Ishmael, R. Akiba, however, says that it means the value of the person who caused the injury (Mekhilta).

Whether he have thrust a son. a son who is a minor;

Or have thrust a daughter. who is a minor. Since it states, (v. 29) “and hath put to death a man or a woman”, one might think that the owner is liable only for the death of adult persons, Scripture therefore states, “whether he have thrust a son etc.” to make him liable for the death of minors equally as for that of adults (Mekhilta).

If [an ox shall thrust] a manservant or a maidservant. Canaanitish servants (Mekhilta).

He shall give thirty shekels. This is the enactment of Scripture (and no reason is given), the indemnity shall be thirty shekels whether the slave was worth a thousand zuz or was worth no more than one denar. A shekel weighs four gold coins, making half an ounce according to the correct weight of Cologne.

And if a man shall open a pit. which was covered over, and he now uncovered it.

Or if a man shall dig [a pit]. Why is this stated? If he becomes liable for opening one that already exists how much the more is he liable for digging a new one! However, it does not mean that he digs a pit from beginning to end but it is intended to include in this law a person who digs after another has dug (i. e. who deepens to a height of ten handbreaths a pit which another has already excavated to a depth less than this. Before he did this an animal which fell into the pit was unlikely to kill itself; now, however, such a fall may prove fatal), that such a one alone becomes liable (cf. Bava Kamma 51a).

And shall not cover it. if, however, he did cover it, though he did not fill it in with earth” he is not liable (Bava Kamma 50a). Scripture speaks of one who excavates a pit in a public thoroughfare (cf. Bava Kamma 49b).

An ox or an ass. This is the law also with respect to all cattle and beasts, because wherever the Torah prescribes something with regard to “ox or ass”, we derive it (the fact that it applies to all cattle and beasts) on the grounds of the verbal similarity of שור in the text in question with שור which occurs in the law prescribing the Sabbath rest, for, with regard to the latter, it is stated, (Exodus 23:12) “that thine ox and thine ass may rest”. Now how is it in the latter case? We know that all cattle and beasts are to be treated in this respect as the “ox”, because in another passage referring to Sabbath (Deuteronomy 5:14) it is expressly said “[thy ox and thy ass] and all thy cattle”! So here, too, all cattle and beasts are to be treated as the ox. The only reason why ox and ass are alone mentioned is to imply: “an ox”, but not a man, “an ass”, but not vessels (Bava Kamma 53b).

The owner of the pit [shall pay for it]. This means the one who occasioned the damage. Although the pit was not his, for he dug it in the public thoroughfare, Scripture regards him as its “owner” (בעל הבור) in so far that he becomes responsible for the damage caused by it.

[the owner of the pit shall pay for it] and restore money unto the owner of them. The word ישיב is apparently redundant; it would have sufficed to state ישלם כסף לבעליו but it is added to include as legal tender in this case even bran (i. e. the restitution need not be money so long as he actually restores something of money-value). (Bava Kamma 7a).

And the dead beast shall belong to him. to him who has suffered the loss. We assess the value of the carcass and he (the claimant) takes it at this value in part payment, and the man who caused the damage pays him in addition to this as much as will make up the whole loss he has suffered (Bava Kamma 10b).

And if [an ox] hurt [an ox of his fellow-man]. יגף means to thrust; whether it injures by horns or the whole body, or whether it kicks with its foot or bites it with its teeth, all are included in the term נגף, for נגף means nothing else than מכה, the impact of one thing upon another (Mekhilta).

. means שור של איש THE OX OF A MAN (i. e. שור is in construct state to the word איש).‎

Then they shall sell the live one. Scripture is speaking of a case when both animals are of the same value: an ox of the value of 200 zuz that killed another also valued at 200 zuz. Then whether the carcass is worth much or whether it is worth little, as soon as one takes one-half of the living animal and one-half of the dead, and the other takes one-half of the living animal and one-half of the dead, it follows that each of them suffers the loss of half the damage which the death of the animal has caused. Scripture teaches us that the תם (which is the animal spoken of here, one that inflicted injury for the first time) always pays half damages. For from what it states about animals of the same value you may gather the rule for such as are of different values, that the law regarding the תם is for its owner to pay half damages, neither more nor less. Or perhaps you might say that also of animals which were of unequal value when living Scripture states that both of them must be halved! But if you say this, you will find that sometimes the man who occasions the damage may benefit considerably, namely, when the carcass is worth when sold unto heathens much more than the value of the ox which inflicted the injury. And you must admit that it is impossible that Scripture should say that the man who occasioned the damage should benefit by it. Or it may sometimes happen that the claimant will receive much more than the value of the whole damage, namely, when one-half of the value of the defendant’s ox is worth more than the whole value of the claimant’s ox. Consequently if you still maintain this (that the animals are to be halved even when they are of different value), the result may well be that the case of the תם is more severely dealt with than that of the מועד (when the claimant gets full damages, but not more). You must therefore needs admit that Scripture speaks here only of animals that are of equal value, and that it teaches you that the owner of a תם has to pay half damages; and from what is said in respect to animals of equal value you may derive the law in respect of such as are of different values, that in any case when a person is paid half the damages caused to him we value the carcass for him (the claimant); and as regards the depreciation in value caused by its death, he must accept a sum equal to half of that depreciation together with the carcass and has to be satisfied (Hebrew: and goes his way). But why does Scripture use this mode of expression and does not simply say: he (the owner of the תם) shall pay the half? To teach you by the way that the תם pays only to the extent of its own value (Hebrew: from what can be obtained for its body). So in case it gores another and itself dies, the claimant gets at most the carcass of the ox that caused the damage, and if that does not amount to one-half of the damage, he has to suffer the loss. Or take another case: an ox of the value of one maneh (200 zuz) that gored an ox of the value of 500 zuz (so that the loss is more than the whole value of the ox that caused it). The claimant still does not get more than the living ox; and the defendant is not bound to make up the deficiency from his own money, for the תם is not responsible to such an extent as to make its owner liable to pay from his own property) (Bava Kamma 16b).

. means, OR it was not a תם but IT IS KNOWN THAT THE OX WAS WONT TO THRUST to-day yesterday and the day before yesterday, thus you have the three acts of goring required to make it a שלם ישלם שור (Bava Kamma 23b)

He shall surely pay an ox [for the ox]. i. e. the full damage.

And the dead shall belong to him. to the claimant (Bava Kamma 23b) as part of this full payment. In addition to it the defendant has to complete the amount until the claimant has been paid for his entire loss.

. [HE SHALL PAY] FIVE OF THE HERD etc., Rabban Jochanan ben Zaccai said, “The Omnipresent has much consideration for the honour of His creatures: when an ox, an animal that can walk by itself, has been stolen and sold or slaughtered, in which case the thief had not to degrade himself by carrying it on his shoulder, he has to pay fivefold restitution. In the case of a lamb, however, which he had to carry on his shoulder, he has to pay only the fourfold, because he was forced to degrade himself by carrying it”. Rabbi Meir said, “Come and see how great is the virtue of labour: In the case of the theft of an ox which he (the thief) withdrew from its labour, thereby causing a loss to its owner, he has to repay five oxen, in the case of a lamb which he has not withdrawn from its labour, only four (Bava Kamma 79b).

… תחת השה for the ox … for the lamb. The text repeats the words שור and שה unnecessarily (for it would have sufficed to state כי יגנוב איש שור וטבחו או מכרו חמשה בקר ישלם תחתיו וארבע הצאן תחת השה “And if a man shall steal an ox … then he shall pay five of the herd for it, or four sheep in place of the lamb”) to tell you that the rule providing for four-fold and five-fold restitution applies solely to the ox and the lamb (and not to any other cattle) (Bava Kamma 67b).

. means when he was breaking in into the house (i. e. in the very act of forcing an entry, but at no other moment).

There shall no guilt of blood be incurred for him. This is not regarded as a murder; it is as though he (the thief) has been dead from the beginning of his criminal act (אין לו דמים is taken to mean: he, the thief, had no blood, no vitality). Here the Torah teaches you the rule: “If one comes with the intention of killing you, be quick and kill him”., And this burglar actually came with the intention of killing you, for he knew full well that no one can hold himself in check, looking on whilst people are stealing his property before his eyes and doing nothing. He (the thief) therefore obviously came with this purpose in view, that in case the owner of the property would resist him, he would kill him (Sanhedrin 72a).

If the sun shone upon him. This is only a metaphorical expression signifying: if the fact is clear to you that he is peaceably disposed towards you. The simile is: just as the sun brings peace (happiness) to the world so if it is evident to you that he did not come with the intention of killing, even if the owner of the property would resist him (Sanhedrin 72a), as, for instance, when a father breaks in to steal the money of his son, for it is certain that the father cherishes feelings of pity for his child and the matter of taking human life is not in his thoughts at all, then

. then he is to be regarded as a living man (cf. Rashi’s explanation of אין לו דמים v. 1.), and it is murder if the householder kills him.

. means the thief shall only restore the money he has stolen but is not subject to the death penalty. Onkelos who renders אם זרחה השמש עליו by, “If the eye of witnesses fall upon him” chose a different way of explaining the verse, namely, that if witnesses surprise him before the householder appears, and when the householder is going towards him they warn him not to kill him (the thief), then דמים לו, he is punishable if he kills him; for since there are people watching him the thief surely has no thought of taking human life and will not kill the owner of the property.

If the theft be certainly found in his hand. i. e. in his possession (Mekhilta), he having neither sold it nor slaughtered it he shall pay only double.

Whether it be an ox or an ass. Every thing stolen whether it be animate or inanimate comes under the category of things for which two-fold compensation (“kefel”) must be made, for it is said in another verse, (8) “[for every matter of tresspass whether it be for ox, for ass…], for sheep, for raiment or for any lost thing … he shall pay double unto his fellow-man”(Bava Kamma 62b).

. means, two living animals (חיים שנים) shall he pay and he shall not give dead animals in payment (Mekhilta), but either living animals or the value of living animals.

. … בעירה ובער All these terms are connected with the word בעיר which signifies “cattle”, as in (Numbers 20:4) אנחנו ובעירנו “we and our cattle" .

. means accordingly, he takes his cattle into the field or the vineyard of his fellow-man and causes damage to him by one of these two ways: either by the mere fact that he lets his cattle go (tread) there (ושלח את בעירו), or by letting it graze there (ובער). Our Rabbis explained (Bava Kamma 2b), that ושלח refers to the damage done by “treading” (Rashi uses a Biblical phrase Deuteronomy 5:1. “treading of the hollow of the foot”) and ובער to the damage caused by the tooth that eats up and removes (מבערת) the crops (grazing).

. means בשדה של אחר IN THE FIELD OF ANOTHER MAN (not “in another field”, when it would be punctuated בְּשָׂדֶה, for בִּשְׁדֵה is the construct form).

… ישלם the best of his field shall he pay. We assess the damage, and if the defendant proposes to make restitution to him for the damage he has suffered with “land’” then he has to pay him with the best of his fields. If for instance the damage amounted to a Sela he has to give him a Sela-worth of the best of the fields he possesses). Scripture teaches you that in cases of damages (which it is proposed to pay with land) we assess and collect them from the best land of the defendant (Mekhilta; Bava Kamma 6b).

If a fire goeth forth. i. e. even if it goeth forth (extends) by itself (Bava Kamma 24b) from the field in which it has been lit into another persons field.

And catch in thorns. chardons in old French

So that the stacks of corn. [OR THE STANDING CORN] BE CONSUMED, because it (the fire) licked up the thorns and gradually reached the stacks of corn or the standing corn, i. e. corn that is still attached to the ground.

Or the field. because it (the fire) liked up his furrow (the newly broken soil), so that it became hard and he (the owner) has to plough it again (Bava Kamma 60a).

He that kindled [the conflagration] shall surely pay. Although he has lit the fire on his own soil and it extended by itself through the thorns which it came across, he has to make restitution because he did not guard his fire (lit., burning coals) that it should not extend and cause damage.

And it be stolen out of the man’s house. i. e. according to his statement)

If the thief be found he. the thief, SHALL PAY שנים DOUBLE to the owner (to the bailor not to the bailee) (Bava Kamma 63b).

If the thief be not found. then this bailee, who is בעל הבית “the owner of the house” for the time being (since the bailment is then in his possession although he is not really its owner), shall come.

And shall approach unto the אלהים. the judges, to put his case against the other and to swear unto him that he has not put forth his hands against his property (Bava Kamma 63b).

For all manner of tresspass. in which he (the bailee) is proved a liar in respect of his oath (i. e. is convicted of perjury), because witnesses testify that he himself has stolen it and the judges condemn him on the evidence of the witnesses

He shall pay the double to his fellow-man. Scripture teaches you that in a case of a bailment where one pleads that it has been stolen from him and it is proved that he himself has stolen it he is liable to pay “kefel” (twice the value of the article) to the owner. When, however, does this law hold good? In the case that he has taken an oath that it has been stolen from him and witnesses afterwards appear and testify to the contrary. For our Rabbis expound this phrase as follows: (Bava Kamma 63b) “and the owner of the house shall approach unto the judges”, this “approaching the judges” is an expression signifying the taking of an oath. You say that it means approaching the judges in order to take an oath, but perhaps this is not so, and it means that he approaches them to put his case, and that the meaning of the verse is. that as soon as the bailee appears before the court and denies any liability, saying, “it has been stolen” from me, he at once becomes liable to pay double if witnessess appear who testify that the bailment is still in his possession? You certainly cannot argue thus! For “conversion” (שליחות יד) is mentioned here and later on (v. 10) it is mentioned again: “Then shall the oath of the Lord be between the two of them, if he hath not put his hand (אם לא שלח ידו) unto his fellow-man’s goods”., Now, what is the meaning of the phrase in the latter case? It is evident from what precedes it that it is a matter of taking an oath! So also here it is a matter of taking an oath. (Bava Kamma 63b).

. means, according to the literal sense, any article about which the witness will say: “this is the very article” about which you have taken an oath that it has been stolen from you; see, it is actually in your possession!, then the matter of dispute between the two of them shall come before the judges. These shall examine the witnesses, and if they prove to be trustworthy and they (the judges) condemn this bailee, then he has to pay double. If, however, they condemn the witnesses because these are found to be “plotting” witnesses (זוממין) then shall they (the witnesses) pay double to the bailee. Our Rabbis, of blessed memory, however, explained that כי הוא זה tells us that no oath can be imposed upon him (the defendant) except if he admits a part of the other’s claim asserting, “So-and-so much I owe you, and the rest has been stolen from me” (according to this explanation the phrase כי הוא זה is not a statement of the witnesses but that of the bailee himself; i. e. he says, כי הוא זה, “it is this only” that you have to claim and not as much as you say) (Bava Kamma 107b).

If a man give unto his fellow-man an ass or an ox. The first section (v. 6, 9) speaks of the gratuitous bailee and therefore (since the chattels are kept for the use of the bailor only) Scripture frees him of liability for theft, as it is written, (v. 6) “[If a man shall give … to keep] and it be stolen out of the man’s house, if the thief be not found, then the owner of the house shall approach the judges” to take an oath (cf. Rashi v. 7). You may learn from this that he (the bailee) frees himself from liability by this oath. This section (v. 9, 12), however, speaks of a “bailee for payment” (שומר שכר) who is therefore not free from liability if the object has been stolen, as it is written, “but if it be certainly stolen from him, he shall pay [unto the owner thereof]” (Bava Metzia 94b). However, for any loss over which he has no control, if, for instance, the animal died a natural death or has been injured by a wild beast, or forcibly seized by robbers, and אין רואה NO ONE SEEING IT that could testify in this matter

Then shall the oath of the Lord be between them both. i. e. he (the bailee) must take an oath that the case was as he says (that it died or was injured or captured), and also that he had not previously put forth his hand against it (the object), using it for his own purposes. For if he had thus “put forth his hand” and afterwards some accident, as described, happened to it he is held liable for loss by accident (Bava Metzia 94b), since he has broken the terms of the contract.

And the owner of it shall accept it. i. e. shall accept the oath (Bava Kamma 106a)

And he. the bailee, SHALL NOT PAY HIM (the bailor) anything, not even the capital (קרן).

If it be torn in pieces. by wild beasts.

Then let him bring witnesses. that it has been torn in pieces by accident and he shall be freed from liability.

He shall not pay that which has been torn. It does not say טרפה לא ישלם “one which has been torn he shall not pay for”, but it says “the torn one”, (the one mentioned here, viz., that which was torn without him being able to prevent it). Because there is a torn beast for which he has to pay and a torn beast for which he has not to pay. For an animal torn by a cat, a fox or a marten he has indeed to make restitution; but for one torn by a wolf, a lion, a bear or a serpent he is not liable to pay. But how do you come to make such a distinction (lit., who whispered to you to draw such a conclusion)? Because, you see, it states, “and if it die or be injured, or be captured”. Now what is the characteristic of natural death? One cannot save from it! Thus, also, the injury and the capture must be such that he was unable to save the animal from it (cf. Mekhilta).

And if a man borrows. The purpose of this verse is to tell you that the borrower is liable for loss from whatever cause even from accident.

The owner thereof not being with it. (lit., with “him”), i. e. if the owner of the ox is not employed with the borrower in his work (Bava Metzia 95b).

But if the owner thereof be with it. (lit., with “him”), whether he be employed in the very kind of work for which the animal has been borrowed, or whether he be employed in any other work of the borrower, provided that he (the owner) was employed by the borrower when the loan was effected it is not necessary, in order to free him from restitution that he should be employed by the bailee at the time when the injury or death took place (Bava Metzia 95b).

If it be hired. i. e. if the ox has not been borrowed but hired, בא בשכרו THEN IT CAME FOR ITS HIRE into the hand of this hirer and not by way of loan. For he does not get the entire benefit of the transaction since he is using it only because he has paid hire for it and consequently the owner benefits also; therefore the law applicable to a borrower does not apply in his case, that he should be held liable for loss by accident. Scripture, however, does not state explicity what his (the hirer’s) law actually is, whether he has to be treated as the gratuitous bailee (שומר חנם) or as the bailee for payment (שומר שכר), and therefore the Sages in Israel differ in their opinion as to how the hirer (שוכר) has to make restitution. R. Meir says he is responsible only as a gratuitous bailee, whilst R. Judah says, even as a bailee for payment (Bava Metzia 80b).

And if a man entice [a virgin]. i. e. if he speaks kindly to her until she submits to him. Thus does also the Targum take it: ארי ישדל “if a man persuades”, the root שדל (the Pael conjugation) in Aramaic being the equivalent of פִּתָּה in Hebrew.

He shall surely give her the marriage price. He shall assign her a marriage portion as is the practice of a man to do to his wife, i. e. he shall write her a Ketuba (marriage contract providing for a marriage portion) and shall marry her (Mekhilta).

As the marriage price of the virgins. which is limited to fifty shekels in the case of one who outrages a virgin, for it is said, (Deuteronomy 22:29) “Then the man that lay with her shall give unto the damsel’s father fifty shekels of silver” (Mekhilta; Ketubot 10a).

Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live. This does not mean that you may kill her but she shall be put to death by the court. Both men and women who practise witchcraft are included in this law but in using the feminine term מכשפה Scripture speaks of what is usually the case; for it is women who mostly practise witchcraft (Sanhedrin 67a).

. All who have carnal connection with beasts, whether men or women, shall surely be put to death, by stoning, for it states of such, (Leviticus 20:16) “their blood is upon them” (cf. Rashi on Exodus 21:17) (Mekhilta)].

. means TO IDOLS, If the word (a noun) were punctuated לֵאלֹהִים, with Tzéré under the first ל it would be necessary to define it more closely by adding the adjective אחרים = strange (gods, idols); now, however, that it says לָאֱלֹהִים it is not necessary to define it more closely by adding the word אחרים. For wherever ל or ב are prefixed to a word if it (the prefix) be punctuated with Chataph (שוא), as e. g., לְמֶלֶךְ a king, לְמִדְבָּר, to a desert, לָעִיר, to a city, it must be explained to which king, to which desert, to which city. The same is the case if the ל or ב has a Chirik instead of a Sheva which happens when they are placed before a word beginning with Sheva, as e .g., in לִמְלָכִים for kings, לִרְגָלִים, for festivals, (quoted from Mishnah Rosh Hashanah 1:1) it is necessary to state for which kings or festivals, and if he does not state this, all kings and festivals are implied by these words. Similarly here: the word לַאלֹהִים “to gods”, would imply “all gods”, including even Him of Whom the term אלהים is used in a holy sense (i. e. the Most High G-d). When, however, it (the prefix) is vowelled with Patach (or Kametz if the following letter cannot take Dagesh), as לַמֶּלֶךְ and לַמִּדְבָּר and לָעִיר it is quite plain which king one is speaking of, and similarly in the case of לָעִיר “to the city”, it is quite plain of which city one is speaking. In the same way, לָאֱלֹהִים, to the gods, means to those gods which in another passage you have been forbidden to worship. A similar instance is, (Psalms 86:8) אין כמוך בָאֱלֹהִים, “there is none like unto Thee among the gods”, because he did not more closely define it by the addition of some word like אחרים, it was necessary for him to vowel the ל with Patach (Kametz).

. means SHALL BE PUT TO DEATH, Why is this verse with its predicate יחרם said at all? Was not the death penalty for him (the idolator) stated in another passage: (Deuteronomy 17:5) “Thou shalt bring forth that man or that woman [who have done that evil thing … and stone them]”? But the reason is: because Scripture does not specify there for what form of worship he (the idolator) is liable to death and it merely states, “and hath gone and served other gods”, now, in order that you might not say that any kind of worship offered to idols is punishable with death, Scripture comes and definitely tells you here: “one who sacrificeth unto any god [shall surely be put to death]”, to teach you that all kinds of worship which have a certain characteristic of “sacrifice” are meant here. What is this characteristic of sacrifice? It is an act of worship performed in honour of the Lord in the “Interior” (i. e. in the Temple)! So I mean to include as punishable by death anyone offering incense and libation since these are also acts of worship performed in the Temple, and that one is liable for these acts if he performed them in honour of any idol, whether this be the usual way of worshipping it or whether this be not the usual way of worshipping it. But other forms of adoration which are shown to some idols but which are not peculiar to the worship of the idol which one happens to be worshipping, if, e. g., one sweeps the place before the idol in its honour, or one lays the dust in front of it by sprinkling water there, or one embraces or kisses it, are not punishable by death (cf. Sanhedrin 60b).

. means, do not vex him with words (referring to the fact that he is a stranger); contrarier in old French Similar is, (Isaiah 49:26) “And I will feed them that vex thee (מוניך) with their own flesh”.

Nor oppress him. by robbing him of money (Mekhilta).

For ye were strangers. If you vex him he can vex you also by saying to you: “You also descend from strangers”. Do not reproach thy fellow-man for a fault which is also thine (Mekhilta). Wherever גר occurs in Scriptures it signifies a person who has not been born in that land (where he is living) but has come from another country to sojourn there.

You shall not afflict any widow, or fatherless child. That is also the law regarding any person, but Scripture is speaking of what usually happens and therefore mentions these in particular, for they are feeble in defensive power (i. e. they have no one to protect them) and it is a frequent occurrence for people to afflict them (Mekhilta).

If thou afflict them in any wise. This is an elliptical phrase, the text threatens but breaks off and does not specify immediately the punishment which will fall upon those who do this. We have the same in, (Genesis 4:15) “Therefore whosoever slayeth Cain …” it threatens but does not specify the punishment. So, here, too: “If thou afflict them in any wise”, this is a threat, as much as to say: “in the end you will get your deserts!” Why are you certain to get them? “Because (כי) if (אם) they cry at all unto Me, I will surely hear their cry”.

And your wives shall be widows [and your children fatherless]. From what is implied in the words, “I will kill you with the sword” do I not know that “your wives shall be widows and your children orphans”? But the explanation of the latter words is not that implied by your question; it is quite a different curse: that the wives will be “fettered” for life, “as living widows” (Rashi is imitating a Biblical phrase, II Samuel 20:3, used in a somewhat similar sense), that there will be no witnesses who can testify to the death of their husbands, and so they will be forbidden to re-marry. In which case the children will be destitute orphans, for the court will not allow them to take possession of the chattels of their fathers, since they do not know whether they have died or have only been taken captives (Mekhilta; Bava Metzia 38b).

If thou lend money to any of my people. R. Yishmael said: wherever אם occurs in Scripture it is used of an act the performance of which is optional, except in three instances, of which this is one (Mekhilta; cf. Rashi on Exodus 20:22 , the translation therefore is: “When thou lendeth etc.”).

To any of my people. If thou hast to choose between lending money to My people and a heathen, My people come first; if between a poor man and one who is better off, the poor man comes first; if between thine own poor (poor relatives) and other poor of thy city, thine own poor come first; if between the poor of thine own city and the poor of another city, the poor of thine own city come first (Mekhilta; Bava Metzia 71a). And this is how the above explanation is implied in the text: “If thou lend money”, את עמי “lend it to My people”, and not to a heathen; and to which one of My people? את העני, to the poor; and to which poor? עמך to him that is with thee (i. e. who is with thee in relationship and is with thee in thy city). [Another explanation of את עמי is: Thou shalt not treat him disrespectfully when lending him money, for he is עמי, though in need he is still “My people”!

. Look at thyself as though thou art the poor man (Midrash Tanchuma 6:15)].

Thou shalt not be unto him as an exactor. you shall not demand the debt of him forcibly. The comparative כ of כנשה suggests thou shalt not be like a נשה: if you know that he has no money do not appear in your attitude towards him as though you had lent him, but as though you had not lent him, it means as much as, do not humble him.

. is what is called in Rabbinical Hebrew רבית (from רבה to increase). It is called נשך “biting”, because it resembles the bite of a snake: it bites, inflicting a small wound in a person’s foot which he does not feel at first, but all at once it swells and distends the whole body up to the top of his head. So it is with interest: at first one does not feel the drain it makes on him and it remains unnoticed until the interest mounts up and suddenly makes the person lose a big fortune (Exodus Rabbah 31:6).

If thou take to pledge. The root חבל never signifies “taking a pledge” at the time when the loan is transacted, but it means taking the goods of the debtor when the date of payment arrives and he does not pay (Bava Metzia 114b). [חבל תחבל, Scripture bids you take the pledge repeatedly, even many times (that is, repeatedly to defer the time of payment). The Holy One, blessed be He, says as it were: “How much do you owe Me! See, your soul ascends night by night to Me and renders account of its doing and so becomes My debtor, and should be kept as a pledge; and yet I return it to you every morning. Thus, too, you should do: take the pledge and restore it, take it again and again restore it!”) (Midrash Tanchuma, Mishpatim 16)].

Restore it unto him till the going down of the sun. Restore it unto him for the whole day until the sun-set, and at night-fall you may take it again till the day-break of the next morning. Scripture speaks here of garment which is worn during the day and which is not required during the night (Bava Metzia 114b).

For that is his raiment. i. e. his upper garment;

. means HIS SHIRT (the שמלה for the skin);

Wherein shall he lie down. These words are used to include amongst the articles which must be returned to him during the day the couch and its coverings on which he rests during day-time (Mekhilta).

Thou shalt not execrate G-d. Here you have the prohibition of blasphemy (the penalty being stated in Leviticus 24:16) and the prohibition of cursing a judge (who is also termed אלהים, cf. Exodus 22:7) (cf. (Mekhilta and Sanhedrin 66a).

[thou shalt not delay to offer from] thy fullness. The duty which falls upon you as soon as your crop becomes fully ripened: this refers to the first fruits (בכורים).

. means THE HEAVE OFFERING, thus do our Rabbis explain it (cf. Mekhilta), but I do not know what the expression דמע means (i. e. I do not know how it comes to have the meaning of (תרומה).

Thou shalt not delay. i. e. thou shalt not alter the prescribed sequence of separating them from the crops, setting aside last what should be first and setting aside first what should be last, i. e. that one should not set aside the heave-offering before the first fruit nor the tithe before the heave-offering (Mekhilta).

The first born of thy sons shalt thou give unto me. by redeeming him from the priest by the payment of five Sela’im. Scripture, it is true, has already given an ordinance concerning him (the firstborn) in another passage (Numbers 18:16), but it is stated here again in order to bring it into juxtaposition with the next verse: “Likewise shalt thou do with that of thine ox”, and to illustrate the latter command by the former. How is it in the case of a human being? He (the father) redeems it after thirty days, for it is said, (Numbers 18:16) “and those that are to be redeemed, from a month old shalt thou redeem”! So, too, has the owner of small cattle to look after it for 30 days and only afterwards must he give it to the priest (cf. Mekhilta and Bekhorot 26b).

Seven days it shall be with its dam. This is an admonition for the priest (for the Israelite himself does not sacrifice the firstborn animal) that if he wishes to bring his offering of this at an earlier date (i.e. in the case of the Israelite having given it to him before the thirtieth or fiftieth day) he is not allowed to offer it before it is eight days old because it is then “short in time” (i. e. too young for sacrifice; cf. Leviticus 22:27).

On the eighth day thou shalt give it me. One might think that it is obligatory to offer it on that day! Scripture, however, uses here the words “eighth day” and uses them again later on, (Leviticus 22:27) “and from the eighth day and henceforth it shall be favourably accepted”, in order to suggest an analogy. Now what is the meaning of the “eighth day” mentioned in the latter passage? It intends to declare the first-born fit for sacrifice from the eighth day and henceforth (i. e. it is intended to fix the earliest possible time on which it may be sacrificed). This, too, in the purpose of the word שמיני used here: to declare it fit for sacrifice from the eighth day and henceforth. The text therefore implies: “on the eighth day thou mayest give it to Me” (and not “thou shalt give it to Me”) (Mekhilta).

And ye shall be men of holiness unto me. If you will be holy and keep yourselves aloof from the loathsomeness of carrion and Trefa you are Mine, if not you are not Mine (cf. Mekhilta).

[neither shall ye eat] any flesh that is torn in the field. The same holds good in case the animal has been torn in the house, only that Scripture speaks of what usually happens mentioning the field because it is the place where it is usual for cattle to be torn. A similar instance is, (Deuteronomy 22:27) “for he found her in the field”, but the same law would apply if he found her elsewhere. Another example is, (Deuteronomy 23:11) “Any man that is unclean by reason of uncleanliness that chanceth him by night”; the same law, however, applies to an uncleanliness that happens by day, but night is mentioned because Scripture speaks of what usually happens (Mekhilta). The Targum renders ובשר בשדה טרפה by ובשר תליש מן חיוא חיא “flesh that is torn off from a living animal”, i. e. flesh that has been torn off through a laceration caused by a wolf or a lion, from a living beast which is permitted to be eaten (e. g., a stag), or from cattle permitted to be eaten.

Ye shall cast it to the dogs. You may give it to a heathen as well as to the dog. Or, perhaps this is not so, but כלב is to be taken literally? Scripture, however, states with regard to carrion, (Deuteronomy 14:21) “Thou shalt give it to a stranger or sell it unto an alien”, from which it follows by a conclusion à fortiori that you may derive whatever benefit you like from the Trefa (and so you also may give it to heathen). But if this be so, what is the force of Scripture expressly saying “to the dog”? It is to teach you that the dog is to be given preference in this respect and Scripture tells you at the same time that G-d does not withhold the reward due to any of His creatures. The dog is entitled to reward because it is stated, (Exodus 11:7) “But against the children of Israel shall not a dog move its tongue”, and this happened. The Holy One, blessed be He, said: Give it the reward it deserves (Mekhilta).

Thou shalt not hear a false report. Take it as the Targum renders it: thou shalt not accept (listen to) a false report. This is a prohibition addressed to one who is about to accept a slanderous statement, and it is addressed also to a judge, that he should not hear the pleadings of one party to a suit before the other appears (Mekhilta; Sanhedrin 7b).

Set not thine hand with the wicked. with him who makes a false claim against his fellow-man: that you promise him to give evidence for him that will result in wrong being done (להיות עד חמס).‎

Thou shalt not follow the many for evil. There are Halachic interpretations of this verse given by the Sages of Israel but the wording of the text does not fit in well with them. They derive from here that we must not decide a person’s guilt by a preponderance of one judge. And the end of the verse they explained thus: אחרי רבים להטות, but if the judges who declare the defendant guilty are two more than those who declare him innocent, then decide the matter as they declare, that he is guilty (Sanhedrin 2a)., The verse, they point out, speaks of capital cases., The middle passage לא תענה על רב, they explained as though it were written על רַב, “thou shalt not speak against the chief of the judges, meaning that one should not give an opinion different from that given by the מופלא of the court (the most eminent among the judges, because this is disrespectful to the Presiding-judge). In consequence of this rule we begin to take the view of those in the side-benches first, we ask the youngest judges to express their opinion first (so that they may not be able to vote against the view expressed by the מופלא). Therefore the exegesis of the verse according to the words of our Rabbis is as follows: “thou shalt not follow a bare majority for evil”, to sentence a man to death on account of the one judge by whom those who condemn him are more in number than those who acquit him; “and thou shalt not speak against the chief inclining away” from his opinion., They explained this latter phrase thus, because the word which is usually written רִיב is here written without and therefore may be read, אחרי רבים להטות;רַב, there is, however, a majority to whose view thou must incline. When is this the case? When there are two who preponderate amongst those who vote for condemnation over and above those who vote for acquittal. For from what is implied in, “thou shalt not follow a bare majority for evil”, I may infer: but thou shall follow it for good. Hence they (the Rabbis) said (i. e. they established the general rule): In capital cases we may decide by a majority of one for acquittal, but only by a majority of at least two to condemn. Onkelos translates the second phrase by: Do not refrain from teaching when you are being asked your opinion in a legal matter. The Hebrew text is to be explained according to the Targum as follows: לא תענה על רב לנטת If you are being asked your opinion in a legal matter do not give your answer just to incline to one particular side and so to withdraw yourself from the dispute, but decide the matter as truth requires. Such are the expositions that have been offered of this verse.

אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים לְהַטּוֹת. וְיֵשׁ רַבִּים שֶׁאַתָּה נוֹטֶה אַחֲרֵיהֶם; וְאֵימָתַי? בִּזְמַן שֶׁהֵן שְׁנַיִם הַמַּכְרִיעִין בַּמְּחַיְּבִין יוֹתֵר מִן הַמְּזַכִּין. וּמִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: לֹא תִהְיֶה אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים לְרָעֹת – שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי: אֲבָל הֱיֵה עִמָּהֶם לְטוֹבָה; מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַטִּין עַל פִּי אֶחָד לִזְכוּת, וְעַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם לְחוֹבָה. וְאוּנְקְלוֹס תִּרְגֵּם: "וְלָא תִתְמְנַע מִלְּאַלָּפָא מָא דִּבְעֵינָךְ [נ"א: מָה דְּמִתְבְּעִי לָךְ] עַל דִּינָא". וְלָשׁוֹן הָעִבְרִי לְפִי הַתַּרְגּוּם כָּךְ הוּא נִדְרָשׁ: לֹא תַעֲנֶה עַל רִב לִנְטֹת - אִם יִשְׁאָלוּךְ דָּבָר לַמִּשְׁפָּט, לֹא תַּעֲנֶה לִנְטוֹת לְצַד אֶחָד וּלְסַלֵּק עַצְמְךָ מִן הָרִיב, אֶלָּא הֱוֵי דָּן אוֹתוֹ לַאֲמִתּוֹ. וַאֲנִי אוֹמֵר לְיַשְּׁבוֹ עַל אָפְנָיו כִּפְשׁוּטוֹ, וְכָךְ פִּתְרוֹנוֹ: לֹא תִהְיֶה אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים לְרָעֹת – אִם רָאִיתָ רְשָׁעִים מַטִּין מִשְׁפָּט, לֹא תֹּאמַר: הוֹאִיל וְרַבִּים הֵם, הִנְנִי נוֹטֶה אַחֲרֵיהֶם.

. and if the defendant asks you about that judgment do not give him as a reply concerning the dispute any statement which will incline after that majority, thereby wresting judgment from the truth, but pronounce the decision just as it should be and let the collar hang around the neck of the majority (i. e. if you be outvoted let them bear the responsibility).

Neither shalt thou countenance [the indigent in his quarrel]. You shall not pay regard to him by finding in his favour in the law suit, saying, “He is a poor man; I will find in his favour, and thus show him some measure of respect.”

If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee. etc., כי here has the meaning of “possibly”, “perhaps”, which is one of the four meanings which the word כי serves to express. The sense of the verse is accordingly the following: Can you possibly see his ass crouching beneath his burden and forbear to help him? (The Hebrew word בתמיה in Rashi means “Say this in the intonation of a question”, and is nothing more than our question mark).

. The root עזב has here the meaning of “helping”. It has a similar meaning in, (Deuteronomy 32:36) “assisted and helped (עזוב)”. Similar also is, (Nehemiah 3:8) “ויעזבו Jerusalem up to the wall”, i. e. they filled it up with earth in order to help and to support the strength of the wall. A similar use of כי is, (Deuteronomy 7:17, 18) כי תאמר בלבבך רבים הגוים האלה וגו׳ which means “Canst thou possibly (כי) speak thus? לא תירא מהם, Do not be afraid of them and speak thus”. Our Rabbis expounded it in a Halachic sense as follows: … כי תראה וחדלת “If thou seest etc. …וחדלת”, there are occasions when you may forbear and there are occasions when you must help. How so? If it is an old man who sees the ass in this condition and it is not compatible with his dignity to intervene, then וחדלת “thou mayest forbear” holds good; or if the animal belongs to a heathen and its burden to an Israelite then, also, וחדלת may be applied (cf. Mekhilta).

Thou shalt surely help him. to unload the burden (Mekhilta). Onkelos also translates it in this sense: מלמשקל ליה which means, [Thou shalt not keep back] from taking the load from off it.

. from the root אבה “to long for”, “to desire”, one who is poverty-stricken and longs for all the good things which he lacks.

And the guiltless and righteous slay thou not. Whence may we infer that in the case that one who left the court after being found guilty and one says, “I have something to plead in his favour”, he has to be brought back in order that the court may listen to this? From what Scripture states, “and the נקי thou shalt not slay”. Although he is not a צדיק, for he has not been acquitted by the court, he is however “free” (נקי) from the death penalty, for it is your duty to plead, as far as possible, in his favour. And whence may we infer, on the other hand, that in the case of one who left the court after having been acquitted and one says, “I have something to say against him” he is not to be brought back that the judges may hear this? From what Scripture states: “and the צדיק slay thou not”, and this man is a צדיק since he has been acquitted by the court (Sanhedrin 33b).

For “i” will not justify the wicked. It is not your duty, in the latter case, to bring the man back to the court, for if he is really guilty, “I” will not acquit him in My court. Altough he has left your hands as innocent “I” have many agents (many means) to inflict upon him the death to which he has made himself liable (Mekhilta).

And thou shalt take no gift. even if you mean to give a true judgment in favour of the giver, and it is a matter of course that you must not accept one to wrest judgment, and therefore there is no need for Scripture to forbid this, for with regard to wresting judgment, whether you take a bribe or not, it is distinctly stated, (Deuteronomy 16:19) “Thou shalt not wrest judgment” (Ketubot 105a).

[for the bribe] blindeth the open-eyed. Even if he be well-versed in the Torah and takes a bribe, in the end his mind will become confused, what he has learnt will be forgotten, and the light of his eyes will become dim (Mekhilta; Ketubot 105a).

. render it as the Targum does: ויקלקל “makes bad”, “perverts”. ...

. means, the words which have been described by the term “righteous”, viz., the judgments of truth uttered on Sinai. Thus, too, does the Targum take it: words that are תריצין, upright.

And thou shalt not oppress the stranger. In numerous passages (36 in number) does the Torah offer a caution about the ill-treatment of the stranger, because his original character is bad (Bava Metzia 59b).

[for ye know] the soul of a stranger. how hard it is for him when people oppress him.

And shalt gather in the increase thereof. אסף is a term denoting “bringing into the house”, like, (Deuteronomy 22:2) “thou shalt gather it (ואספתו) into thine house” (cf. Rashi on Genesis 49:29).

Thou shalt let it rest. by not tilling it (Mekhilta)

And thou shalt abandon it. by not eating of its produce (Mekhilta) after “the time of removal” of the produce has arrived. Another explanation is: תשמטנה THOU SHALT LET IT REST, from what is real work, as, for example, ploughing and sowing, ונטשתה AND LEAVE IT ALONE, not even to manure and to hoe it.

And what they leave the beasts of the field. (the wild animals) SHALL EAT, This cannot be a command that the wild animals shall eat it, viz., that you shall permit them to eat it. No such command is necessary since you have no control over wild animals; it intends by juxtaposition with the preceding words to place in the same category (more lit., to compare) the food of the poor with that of the beast. For how is it in the case of the wild animal? It eats food without the tithe having been separated from it! So too, the poor may in the seventh year eat food without the tithe having been separated from it. From this juxtaposition they (the Rabbis) derived the rule that the law of tithe is not to be observed in the seventh year (Mekhilta).

In like manner thou shalt do with thy vineyard. The first member of the verse, however, speaks of a “white field” (i. e. a bright, shadeless field, a grain field or a vegetable field, in contrast to a שדה אילן which casts shade), as it is said above, (v. 10) “thou shalt sow thy land”.

[six days shalt thou do thy work] and on the seventh day thou shalt leave off. Even in the Sabbatical year you shall not abrogate the weekly Sabbath: you shall not say, “Since the whole year bears the name of ‘Sabbath’, the weekly Sabbath need not to be observed” (Mekhilta).

. means, give it (the animal) some satisfaction (ניח) by permitting it to pull up and eat grass from the ground as it pleases. Or, perhaps, this is not the meaning but it means that is must rest: that one must tie it up in its stall so that it does no work in the field! You will, however, admit this is no satisfaction but a source of annoyance (Mekhilta).

The son of thy handmaid. Scripture speaks of an uncircumcised Canaanitish servant; (that the circumcised servant should rest is already mentioned in Deuteronomy 5:14: עבדך ואמתך כמוך) (cf. Mekhilta).

. means a גר תושב, a proselyte settler (one who renounces idolatry and thus acquires limited citizenship in Palestine).

And in all that i have said to you take heed. This statement is intended to bring every positive command (מצות עשה) also under the category of a prohibition (לאו); for wherever the term שמר, “take heed”, is used in the Torah it is an admonition in the place of (having the force of) a prohibition (cf. Yalkut Shimoni on Torah 355).

Make no mention [of the name of other gods]. This means that one must not say to another: “Wait for me near such-and-such an idol”, or, “Stay with me on the festival of such-an-such an idol’” (mentioning its name) (cf. Mekhilta; Sanhedrin 63b). Another explanation of verse 13 is: the juxtaposition of “Be heedful in respect of everything that I have spoken to you” with “and the names of other gods ye shall not mention” is intended to teach you that the practise of idol-worship is of equal heinousness as though one had infringed every command (cf. Horayot 8a); and that one who avoids it may be regarded as though he had observed every one of them (cf. Chullin 5a).

It shall not be heard. from a heathen, THROUGH THINE AGENCY, i. e. you shall make no business partnership with a heathen through which it might happen that he will take an oath by the name of his god, for consequently you will have brought it about that it has been mentioned through your agency (cf. Sanhedrin 63b).

עַל פִּיךָ. שֶׁלֹּא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֻׁתָּפוּת עִם גּוֹי, וְיִשָּׁבַע לְךָ בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שֶׁלּוֹ; נִמְצֵאתָ שֶׁאַתָּה גּוֹרֵם שֶׁיִּזָּכֵר עַל יָדְךָ (סנהדרין ס"ג ע"ב).

. means TIMES. Similar is, (Numbers 22:28) “that thou hast smitten me these three times (רגלים‎)”.

The month of אביב. it is the month when the grain becomes full in its ripe state (באביה). The word אביב is connected with אַב which signifies maturity, and being the first of the fruit to ripen (cf. Rashi on Exodus 9:31).

And none shall appear before my face empty. When you come to appear before My face on the festivals, bring Me burnt-offerings (Mekhilta; Chagigah 7a).

And the festival of harvest. this is the Feast of Weeks

. which is the time for bringing the first-fruits, for the offering of the two loaves that were brought on the Feast of Weeks made it permissible for the first time during the year to use the new harvest of wheat for the meal offerings (Menachot 68b), and to bring the first fruits into the Temple, (Mishnah Bikkurim 1:3) for it is said, (Numbers 28:26) “And on the day of the first fruits etc., [בשבעתיכם on your weeks etc.]” (cf. Rashi on that verse).

And the festival of the ingathering. that is the Feast of Tabernacles.

When thou hast gathered in thy labours. For during the whole summer-time the fruits are drying in the fields and about the Festival (הָחָג is a Talmudical term for the Feast of Tabernacles) they are gathered into the barns on account of the rain that is then due.

Three times. etc., Because this section speaks mainly of the Sabbatical year, it was necessary to state that the sequence of the festivals should not be disturbed even in this year of agricultural rest (Mekhilta; cf. Rashi on v. 12).

. means all the male population among you.

. means, you shall not sacrifice the Passover-lamb on the fourteenth day of Nisan before you have removed the leavened bread from your house (Mekhilta). (This verse is to be connected with v. 15).

Neither shall the fat of my sacrifice remain. away from the altar (cf. the Targum).

Until morning. One might think, however, that the meaning is, that it shall not remain overnight on the altar and that the sacrifice would therefore become invalid even through the fat remaining overnight on the “wood-pile” of the altar! Scripture, however, states, (Leviticus 6:2) “[This is the law of the burnt-offering; it is that which may go up] on the fire-place of the altar all the night, [any time until the morning]”(Mekhilta)

. Therefore the statement ולא ילין means, that this law of leaving the fat away from the altar overnight is infringed only if it has not been placed on the altar by the dawn of the morning, for it says, “[neither shall the fat remain] until morning”, but any time during the whole night one may lift it up from the pavement on to the altar (cf. Megillah 20b).

The first of the. FIRST-FRUITS OF THY GROUND [THOU SHALT BRING etc.], Even in the seventh year the offering of the first fruits is obligatory in some cases, therefore here also (where Scripture mainly deals with the laws of the Sabbatical year) it is stated: “the first of the first-fruits of thy land [shalt thou bring, etc.]”. How was the procedure at the setting apart of the first fruits? A man goes into his field and sees a fig which was the first to ripen; he ties a piece of reed-grass round it to distinguish it and so marks its sacred character (Mishnah Bikkurim 3:1). The law of the first fruits applies only to the seven kinds of produce that are mentioned in Scripture: (Deuteronomy 8:8) “a land of wheat and barley etc.”, for which Palestine is praised in that verse (Mishnah Bikkurim 3:1).

Thou shalt not cook a kid. A calf and a lamb also are comprehended under the term גדי, for גדי means nothing more than a young tender animal, as you may gather from the fact that you will find in several passages in the Torah that the term גדי is used and that the writer felt it necessary specially to explain it by adding after it the word עזים, as, e. g., (Genesis 38:17) “I will send forth a גדי of the goats”; (Genesis 38: 20) “the גדי of the goats”; (Genesis 27:9) “two kids of the goats (גדיי עזים)”. This fact serves to show you that wherever גדי is mentioned without further description the term implies also a calf and a lamb., In three different passages the law לא תבשל גדי is written: once for the purpose of prohibiting the eating of meat-food with milk-food, once to prohibit us from deriving any other benefit (besides eating) from such mixture, and once to prohibit the boiling of meat with milk (Mekhilta; Chullin 115b).

Behold, i send a messenger [before thee]. Here they were informed that they would once sin and that the Divine Majesty would have to tell them, (Exodus 33:3) “for ‘I’ will not go up among thee” (cf. Exodus Rabbah 32:3).

. means, WHICH I HAVE PREPARED in order to give unto you. This is the literal meaning of the verse. The Midrash (taking the word as connected in meaning with the term כִּוֵן “to put a thing in a line with” or “to make it correspond with” another thing) explains אל המקום אשר הכנתי to signify “to the place opposite to which I have long since established the seat of my Glory” (“the place” therefore denotes the Temple; cf. Rashi on Exodus 15:17). This is, according to the Midrash, one of the verses which implicitly state that the Temple in Heaven is situated exactly opposite (מְכֻוָּן) that on the earth (Midrash Tanchuma, Mishpatim 18)

Exasperate him not. This verb is a term denoting rebellion (המראה), similar to, (Joshua 1:18) “Whosoever he be that rebel (ימרה) against thy commandment”.

For he will not pardon your trespass. He is not accustomed to it (to sin) for he is one of a class of beings who never sin. Besides he is only a messenger and only carries out the mission entrusted to him (i. e. he has no right to pardon you, for this is My prerogative: it is his only to insist upon obedience to My commands) (Midrash Tanchuma, Mishpatim 18).

For my name is in him. This passage must be connected with the beginning of the verse: Take heed of him etc., for (כי) My Name is associated with his (i. e. whatever he does, he does in My Name). Our Rabbis said that he (the angel) is Mattatron (מטטרון) whose name is even as the name of his Master, for מטטרון has the numerical value of שדי “the Almighty” (Sanhedrin 38b).

. render this as the Targum does: I will distress.

[but] thou shalt utterly overthrow them. those gods.

Their monuments. stones which they set up (root נצב) before which to prostrate themselves.

There shall nothing be bereaved of young. if you will act according to My will.

Bereaved of young. A woman who miscarries or who buries her children at a very early age is called משכלה.

I will confound. This is equivalent to וְהָמַמְתִּי (i. e. the root is המם). Its rendering in the Targum is ואשנש “and I will confound”. Similar is every verb the root of which has its last letter doubled (verbs ע"ע): when it is changed (conjugated) to express the idea of “I have done something” (i. e. the first person singular perfect of the Kal; the same really applies to some inflected forms of other conjugations also) there are occasions when one omits the doubled letter (it is actually the first of the two similar letters) and dageshes the remaining letter of these two and vowels it with מלאפום (our חולם). Examples are: וְהַמֹּתִי which is of the same derivation as, (Isaiah 28:28) “and the wheel of his cart makes a confused noise (המם)”; (Ecclesiastes 2:20) וְסַבֹּתִי, “and I turned about” which is of the same derivation as, (I Samuel 7:16) “and he went round (וסבב) to Bethel”; (Psalms 116:6) דַלֹּתִי “I was low”, of the same derivation as, (Isaiah 19:6) “The waters shall become low (דללו) and dried up”; (Isaiah 49:16) “I have graven thee (חַקֹּתִיךְ) upon the palms of my hand”, of the same derivation as, (Judges 5:15) “things engraved (חקקי) in the heart”; (I Samuel 12:3) את מי רַצֹּתִי “whom have I crushed”, of the same derivation as, (Job 20:19) “because he hath crushed (רצץ) and hath forsaken the poor”. He, however, who translates it in the Targum by וְאֶקְטַל , is in error. For if it were derived from the root denoting death (מות), the ה in it would not be vowelled with Patach and its מ would not be dageshed nor vowelled with חולם, but it would read וְהַמַתִּי, as, (Numbers 14:15) “Now if Thou shalt kill (וְהַמַתָּ) this people”, the ת being dageshed because it would come in place of two ת’s, one being a root-letter, for no form of מות can be written without at least one ת (that in the root), and the other being a servile letter (part of the suffix), just as תִּי in אמר-תי and חמא-תי and עשי-תי. Similarly with נתתי: the second ת is dageshed because it comes in the place of two ת’s, since it (the word) really requires three ת’s, two for the root, as in, (Joshua 10:12) “the day when the Lord giveth (תת)”, and in, (Ecclesiastes 3:13) “it is the gift (מתת) of G-d”, and the third as a servile letter.

Nape of the neck. i. e. they will flee before you and so turn the napes of their necks to you.

The hornets. This is a kind of insect which wounded their eyes and injected poison in them, so that they died. The hornets did not cross the Jordan and the Hittite and the Canaanite whom Scripture mentions here as being driven out by them were the inhabitants of the land of Sichon and Og (on the east side of the Jordan). It is for this reason that Scripture enumerates here of all the seven nations that Israel fought against when entering Palestine only these two (cf. Joshua 24:12, where the text expressly states that the peoples driven out by the hornets were those of שני מלכי האמרי, “of the two kings of the Amorites” who are identical with Sihon and Og). But the Hivites lived on the other bank of the Jordan and somewhat beyond it and yet it states here that the hornets would drive them out! They were indeed driven out by the hornets, for our Rabbis have explained in Treatise Sotah 36a that the hornets placed themselves on the east bank of the Jordan and from there cast the poison against them.

Desolate. empty of human beings, for you are but few and not sufficient to fill it all up.

. means, [LEST THE ANIMALS OF THE FIELD] MULTIPLY AGAINST THEE.

Until thou be fruitful. i. e. until you become many. תפרה is of the same root and meaning as no fruit, as, (Genesis 1:28) פרו ורבו “be fruitful and multiply”.

. is of the root שית or שות. The ת is dageshed, because it comes in place of two ת’s (ושת-תי), one is necessary because no grammatical form of שות can be without the ת of the root, and the other is a servile letter (part of the suffix).

Unto the river. the Euphrates.

. means AND THOU SHALT DRIVE THEM OUT.

For if thou serve. etc., Both particles כי in this verse have the meaning of אשר “that”. It has this meaning in several passages. This is really the sense of the Aramaic word אי (Hebrew אם) which itself is one of the four meanings in which כי is used (cf. Gittin 90a. where the four usages of כי are given). In fact we find אם (‎אי) used in many passages in the sense of אשר, e. g., (Leviticus 2:14) ואם תקריב where it certainly should not be translated “if”, but ”when thou offer an offering of thy first-fruits”, for this offering is not optional but is obligatory (cf. Rashi on that verse).

And unto Moses he said. This section was spoken before the Ten Commandments were given (i. e. אמר is the pluperfect); it was the fourth of Sivan when “Come up” was said to him (Shabbat 88a).

And Moses alone shall step near. unto the thick darkness (cf. Exodus 20:18).

And Moses came and related to the people. on that same day (the 4th of Sivan).

All the words of the Lord. the commands concerning their keeping apart from women and the setting of bounds at Mount Sinai.

And all the judgments. which had been ordained before the Sinaitic legislation: the seven commands given to the “Sons of Noah” (the non-Israelite world), the law of the Sabbath, of filial respect, of the “red heifer” and regarding the administration of justice, all of which had been given to them already in Marah (cf. Sanhedrin 56b).

And Moses wrote [all the words of the Lord]. from בראשית up to (but not including) the account of the Giving of the Torah and he wrote down the commandments that were given to them in Marah (cf. Mekhilta on Exodus 19:10).

And rose up early in the morning. on the fifth of Sivan (cf. Rashi on Exodus 19:11) (Shabbat 88a).

The lads. the first-born sons (Zevachim 115b; Onkelos).

And Moses took the half of the blood. Who divided it into halves? An angel came down and divided it (Leviticus Rabbah 6:5).

In basons. There were two basons, one for holding the half of the blood of the burnt offering and the other for holding the half of the blood of the peace offerings, in order to sprinkle it (both bloods) on the people. From here have our Rabbis inferred (Keritot 9a) that our ancestors entered into the covenant with G-d by means of circumcision, immersion and sprinkling of blood, and although immersion is not mentioned in this paragraph it must have taken place, for no sprinkling is effective without immersion preceding it (cf. Tosafot Yevamot 46b ד"ה דאין הזאה בלא טבילה).‎

The book of the covenant. the book which we have said contained the part of the Torah from בראשית till the “Giving of the Torah” including the Commandments that were given to them at Marah (Mekhilta; cf. Rashi on v. 4).

. means sprinkling, he sprinkled it on the people (not he threw it against the people, as this word might imply; cf. e. g., Exodus 9:8: וזרקו משה השמימה). The Targum, however, renders it by: and he poured it (the blood) upon the altar as atonement for (על) the people, adding the words “upon the altar”, and taking על העם to denote “on behalf of the people”, i. e. he poured it out to atone for the people.

Now they saw the G-d of Israel. They gazed intently and failing in this they peeped in their attempt to catch a glimpse of the Supreme Being, and thereby made themselves liable to death. But it was only because G-d did not wish to disturb the joy caused by the Giving of the Torah, that He did not punish them instantly, but waited (postponed the punishment) for Nadab and Abihu until the day when the Tabernacle was dedicated, when they were stricken with death, and for the elders until the event of which the text relates, (Numbers 11:16) “And when the people complained …. and the fire of the Lord burned among them and destroyed בקצה המחנה”, those who were the קצינים “nobles” of the camp (Midrash Tanchuma, Beha'alotcha 16).

As it were the brickwork of sapphire. This had been before Him during the period of Egyptian slavery as a symbol of Israel’s woes, for they were subjected to do brick-work (cf. Jerusalem Talmud Succah 6:3; Leviticus Rabbah 23:8).

And as it were as the body of heaven for purity. This implies that as soon as they (the Israelites) were delivered there was radiance and rejoicing before Him.

. Translate it as the Targum does: “as the appearance”.

. means FOR BRIGHTNESS AND CLEARNESS.

And upon the nobles. these were Nadab and Abihu and the elders

He laid not his hand. This implies that they well deserved that G-d should stretch forth His hand against them (Midrash Tanchuma, Beha'alotcha 16).

And they beheld G-d [and did eat and drink]. They gazed at him intimately as though their association with Him were a matter of eating and drinking. Thus does the Midrash Tanchuma, Beha'alotcha 16 explain it. Onkelos, however, does not translate the passage this way (i. e. he does not take it in a depreciative sense that Nadab and Abihu and the elders acted improperly. His translation is: they beheld G-d’s Glory and rejoiced in their offerings which were accepted as though they were eating and drinking).

ה’ אל משה and the Lord said to Moses. after the Giving of the Law

Come up to me into the mountain and remain there. forty days.

[and i will give thee] the tablets of stone, and the law, and the commandment which i have written to teach them. All the six hundred and thirteen commandments are implicitly contained in the Ten Commandments and may therefore be regarded as having been written on the tablets. Rabbi Saadia specified in the אזהרות which he has composed those commandments which may be associated with each of the Ten Commandments.

And Moses rose and his minister joshua. I am not sure in what capacity Joshua appears here, but I think that as a disciple he was accompanying the teacher as far as the place where the bounds of the mountain were marked out, whence onward he was not permitted to proceed. From that point ויעל משה MOSES alone ASCENDED אל הר האלהים THE MOUNTAIN OF G-D, whilst Joshua pitched his tent there and stayed there during the whole forty days which Moses spent on the mountain. For thus we find that when Moses came down from the mountain it states, (Exodus 32:17) “and Joshua heard the voice of the people that they shouted”, from which we may infer that he was not with them in the camp.

But unto the elders he said. when he left the camp (אמר in the sequence of verbs which we find here denotes the pluperfect; the translation therefore is: and to the elders he had said).

Abide ye here for us. and stay ye with all the other people in the camp so as to be ready to decide his dispute for each man.

[and] hur. He was the son of Miriam and his father was Caleb the son of Jephunneh, as it is said, (1 Chr. 2:9) “Caleb took unto him Ephrath, who bare him Hur”; and Ephrath is identical with Miriam, as it is stated in Treatise Sotah 11b.

He who has any matter to do. i. e. he who has any law-suit.

And the cloud covered it. (lit., “him”) [SIX DAYS], Our Rabbis are of different opinions as to what this passage means. Some of them hold that these were the six days from the first of Sivan (until the Feast of Weeks, the day of the Giving of the Law)

. and that the word ויכסהו in the phrase ויכסהו הענן “the cloud covered him” or covered “it” means that it covered the mountain.

And he called unto Moses on the seventh day. of Sivan to utter the Ten Commandments. It is true that Moses and all Israel were standing there but the text states, “He called unto Moses” merely to give special honour to Moses calling him by name. Others, however, say that the passage means: AND THE CLOUD COVERED HIM, Moses, FOR SIX DAYS after the Ten Commandments had been given. These were at the beginning of the forty days which Moses spent on Mount Sinai when he went up to receive the Tablets, and Scripture teaches you that whosoever enters the camp of the Divine Majesty (here the mountain and later on the Holy of Holies) requires separation from others (must live in seclusion) for six days (Yoma 4a).

Into the midst of the cloud. This cloud was thick like smoke and G-d made a path for Moses through it (Yoma 4b).